The Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust (FCIT) is the oldest surviving closed end fund in the world today. Its early success was related to its identification of a missing market, namely, the provision of a wholesale diversified investment vehicle for the investing public.
The Foreign and Colonial Investment Trust (FCIT) is the oldest surviving closed end fund in the world today. Established in 1868 as the Foreign and Colonial Government Trust, it was substantially reorganised a decade later. An analysis of the annual portfolios from 1879, when its shares first became listed on the London Stock Exchange, until 1913 provides an insight into how one sophisticated investor approached the rapidly expanding world of international investment during the First Era of Globalisation (O'Rourke and Williamson 1999, Obstfeld and Rogoff 2004) . Previous research has concentrated on the character and determinants of the aggregate capital flows from Britain (Edelstein 1982 , Stone 1999 and Germany (Esteves 2007) and concluded that fundamentals such as longterm growth prospects were indeed important along with political risk and institutional conditions.
FCIT was at the forefront of this wave of foreign investment. The early success of FCIT was related to its identification of a missing market -that for wholesale investment in diversified portfolios by the general public -particularly at a time when domestic securities were yielding historically low returns. The advantages of the mutual fund structure, first adopted by the Dutch in the 18 th century (Rouwenhorst 2004) , quickly became obvious and led FCIT to expand its investment horizons from the initial portfolio of "well-selected
Government Stocks" to an array of foreign and colonial securities. By 1913, the fund reported holdings of 313 securities, 85% of which were corporate. Throughout the period, FCIT kept its focus on foreign securities in emerging markets, a strategy which was also emulated by many of the 61 investment trusts operating in London on the eve of World War I with a combined market capitalization of over £60 million (according to Investor's Monthly Manual data).
In this paper, we first describe the types of securities held, the countries, industries and credit risks to which FCIT was exposed before estimating the risk and return of the portfolios over the whole period. Furthermore, we consider how closely the portfolios approached the efficient frontier based on historic risk and returns. In large part, FCIT was a global emerging bond portfolio. As such, it weathered several financial crises around the world, most notably Argentina in 1891-2, and suffered a succession of defaults in its portfolio. We consider each of these episodes and how FCIT responded to them.
Overall, the FCIT is a case study of the risks and opportunities confronting international investors over a period of 33 years by a rapidly expanding developing world and offers a fascinating comparison with the situation available to emerging market investors today during the second era of globalisation.
In the next section we describe the origins of the investment trust industry and FCIT in particular. Section 1 reviews the literature on international investment and on reverse home bias during the First Era of Globalisation. Section 2 describes our data and presents summary statistics on the FCIT portfolios. Section 3 discusses the extent of diversification achieved by the FCIT portfolios and section 4 reviews the trust's annual performance.
Section 5 compares and contrasts the emerging debt returns during this first age of globalisation with the returns generated during the more recent period since the 1980s.
Section 6 concludes.
Literature review
This paper links with three strands of literature dealing with the first era of financial globalisation 1870-1914, namely , with that regarding the patterns, costs and benefits of international capital flows, the investor home bias debate in Britain, and the role of a particular financial innovation, the investment trust (aka. closed end fund), in helping to facilitate the emergence of a global capital market. This first era of financial globalisation is of considerable interest both to historians of international finance and to those engaged in the current debate on the virtues and pitfalls of international financial integration. Even by today's standards, this was a period of remarkable capital mobility, whereby a restricted group of nations -the UK, France, Germany, Belgium, and Netherlands -exported a significant share of their national savings to the emerging market countries of the time (Obstfeld and Taylor 2004) . 1 Intuitively, this was a mutually favourable trade, as surplus countries gained access to better investment opportunities, and emerging nations financed a rapid capital deepening, mainly through investment in infrastructure complementary to their pattern of specialisation in international trade. Such a claim is supported by the evidence on de jure financial liberalisation during the four decades before 1914, a period remarkable for an absence of legal barriers, imposed either by capital-exporting or capital-receiving nations, to the unfettered flow of capital across borders (Quinn 2003 , Esteves 2011 Faria et al. (2011) confirmed this result from the dual perspective of the yields at which investors were willing to lend to emerging countries for both the pre-1913 and post-1970 periods of financial globalisation. The similarity with the empirical results for the modern period is striking (Alfaro et al. 2008 , Bekaert and Harvey 2003 , Gelos and Wei 2005 .
There was, to be sure, a 'dark side' of capital market integration. As emerging nations became increasingly dependent on foreign finance, they also became unable to choose the currency in which they borrowed from abroad ('original sin') as well as subject to 'sudden stops' of external finance due to their own deteriorating fundamentals or 'contagion' from other emerging countries (Catão 2006; Bordo, Cavallo and Meissner 2010; Kaminsky, Reinhart and Végh 2003) . Furthermore, there is evidence that the credit cycle in core capitalexporting nations also had a direct impact on financial stability along the periphery, as today (Bordo 2006) . A number of authors have tried to compare the frequency, nature, and costs of financial crises across time (Bordo et al. 2001 , Eichengreen and Bordo 2003 , Adalet and Eichengreen 2005 , Reinhart and Rogoff 2009 . The main result from this literature is that the frequency and type of crises are not independent from the underlying policy regime and, hence, cannot be fully explained by the degree of financial globalisation. In particular, crises were much less frequent during the classical gold standard (before 1914) than today, despite comparable levels of financial integration.
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Although less frequent, there is no evidence that pre-1914 crises were less severe in terms of lost output than in the recent past. However, this in itself is not conclusive, as we have to subtract the costs of volatility from the income gains, either through accelerated convergence (in a Solow world) or even permanently higher growth rates, in models with investment externalities. Meissner and Bordo (2007) make this comparison explicitly and conclude that, over the long-run, capital openness contributed to higher per capita income growth, despite in the short-run being associated with more frequent crises and output losses. Everything considered, emerging economies seem to 'have chosen the good part'.
What of the investing nations, led most notably by Britain? Here, overseas investment was often condemned by contemporaries and by later historians for exhibiting reverse home bias and forsaking investment in domestic industry. British investors were criticised for taking excessive risk on 'exotic' foreign securities, regarding which little reliable information existed and meagre protection due to differences in jurisdiction and sovereign immunity. In the UK, domestic industrial interests blamed the reverse home bias on the 'gentlemanly capitalists' in the City and the government's deferential treatment of financial and banking interests (Cain and Hopkins 1980, Rubinstein 1987 In Britain, however, arms-length capital markets were more prevalent and this role of This detailed micro study is complementary to earlier and broader studies of the development of investment trusts in Britain and the US (Scratchley 1875 , Burton and Corner 1968 , Bullock 1959 , DeLong and Shleifer 1992 , Newlands 1997 , and Rutterford 2009 ). This portfolio offered a yield of around 8% and was funded by issuing trust certificates of £100 par value paying a coupon of 6% per annum at an offer price of £85. 9 The certificates possessed an embedded lottery feature in that any reserves accruing after payment of the 6% coupon were used for a sinking fund under the terms of which certificates were randomly drawn each year and repurchased at par. It was originally intended that the trust have a life of 24 years and that its investments were to be held to maturity and could only be sold under exceptional circumstances such as the approach of financial distress. Over the next 5 years FCGT made a further 5 issues of certificates to invest in foreign government bonds and a sixth in 1873 to create the American Investment Trust to invest in US railroads.
Origins of FCIT and the Investment Trust industry
In 1879, following the ruling in Sykes v. Beadon which declared the common law trust structure illegal, FCGT along with almost all the rest of the investment trust industry converted themselves into joint-stock companies and adopted a capital structure more familiar to investors in investment trusts or closed end funds today. The trust was also keen to put an end to its embedded lottery feature by this restructuring. All outstanding £100
certificates were exchanged for a combination of preferred stock and deferred stock. 10 Both securities carried equal voting rights but the former paid a fixed dividend of 5% and ranked ahead of the latter in paying dividends; the deferred stock then received any dividends declared in excess of the 5%. In 1879, there were approximately £1.2m and £1.1m of nominal preferred and deferred stock respectively. Hence, such a capital structure introduced a substantial element of gearing into the trust at slightly over 100% which remained virtually unchanged.
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As to the management of the trust, the Board of Directors was collectively responsible for managing the portfolio and comprised the four original trustees appointed for life together with between 8 and 12 additional directors. However the four trustees retained their veto over all transactions. Portfolio turnover was intentionally kept very low and there was no separately appointed investment manager up to 1913. It has been argued that the City and social connections of the trust directors and their interlocking directorships were important in bringing about a judicious selection of investments.
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A second new issue boom when 72 new trusts were floated on the LSE occurred between 1887 and 1890. 13 This boom saw the creation of a new breed of "financial" trust which sought to boost investment returns by earning fee income from underwriting new 9 McKendrick and Newlands (1999: 32-34) . 10 McKendrick and Newlands (1999, ch.3) . 11 The only subsequent change was a modest further issue of £47,500 nominal value of preferred stock in 1891. 12 Cassis (1994: 150-52) . 13 Burton and Corner (1968: 28) , It is worth summarising the main features of the FCIT as it evolved up to 1913. First, diversification was a primary objective together with the provision of a yield premium to that available in British Consols. Second, although FCIT disclosed its portfolio holdings annually and therefore transparency was relatively good compared to many other trusts at that time, all holdings were nonetheless stated at book cost and investors would not have been told the net asset value (NAV) of the underlying investments to which they were entitled. Third, the investment approach was to buy and hold securities to maturity, unless the prospect of financial distress created a need to sell early, and there was no attempt to enter into markettiming. Fourth, with no appointment of a specialist portfolio manager until 1924, the trust was managed by its trustees, and overall expense ratios were very low between 0.2% and 0.25% of total assets compared to a level today at least four or five times this figure. Lastly, the incentives of the trustees and directors as investment managers were well aligned in that each director was required to hold a minimum of £1,000 of nominal value of shares.
We shall explore some of these features in more detail in the sections that follow and once we have described the data in more detail. were also taken from the latter two publications. Benchmark security returns data for this period is taken from Chabot and Kurz (2010) .
Data and Descriptive Statistics

Data Description
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Whilst we have made every effort to price the FCIT portfolios, we have been unable to locate market prices for between 10 and 15% of the portfolio across the period. It is likely that these securities were either traded infrequently, were traded on a regional stock exchange for which prices were not collected or were unquoted investments privately placed with FCIT. Since we believe that the portfolio characteristics analysis which follows below is more informative when expressed in market values, we have valued these holdings at the offer price where disclosed, par value where no offer price exists, or at zero value where coupon payments have not been paid. 
Portfolio characteristics
FCIT spearheaded the development of the investment trust industry in the UK and the World by exploiting the opportunities for portfolio diversification to the full. In keeping with the investment orthodoxy of the times, the trust was predominantly invested in fixed-income securities ( Table 1) . On average less than 10% of the portfolio (by number of securities or market value) was invested in stocks, and about half of that was taken up by preferred stock.
By industrial sector, stockholdings were concentrated in railways and especially manufacturing.
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Furthermore, the FCIT invested mainly in long-dated bonds. Over the whole period, the average maturity of redeemable bonds stood at 35 years. In the 1880s, this exposure was mainly driven by investments in government perpetual bonds, which remained around two thirds until 1889, thereafter declining to 22% on the eve of WW1.
18 Foreign and Colonial Archives. 19 In the case of Burdett's, the price was quoted as a high/low for the year and we used the simple average. 20 We have deflated these nominal returns with the deflator from Feinstein, tabs. 2 and 5. 21 The portfolio characteristics analysis has also been done in terms of par values and our main findings remain unaltered. 22 On average, 16% of railway investments were held as stock, while the corresponding figure for manufacturing and other industries was 40%. Table 1 and Table 2 here FCIT's investments displayed a distinct international focus as its name implied. The extent of the regional breakdown is summarised in Table 2 which displays the cumulative number of stocks and the corresponding maximum value invested across the whole period.
Whilst FCIT did invest in British securities, the total amount was very modest at only £8 million and was dwarfed by the investments in the US (£103 million) and Argentina (£78 million).
Increasingly, the primary focus of the fund was the investments in the emerging New World, which represented at least 70% of the total market value following the change in investment guidelines, with both North and South America leading the way (Figure 1 ).
Notwithstanding the dramatic Baring crisis of 1890 and the substantial contagion in emerging markets that it brought about (Mitchener and Weidenmier 2008) , increasingly, the FCIT maintained this heavy allocation to a single geographic region. Despite the trust's name, the average allocation to British Empire securities trended down over time from 14% in the 1880s to 7% after 1899 (see Table 3 below).
Figures 1 and 2 here
In the period 1880-1913, the FCIT invested in 882 different securities, sold by 443 issuers spread across 46 countries, territories and colonies. The impact of the 1891 enlargement of the object of the trust to non-government issues is also evident in the stepwise increase in the number of securities, rising to over 300 on the eve of WW1. As the number of securities increased, portfolio concentration, measured by the percentage of the portfolio invested in the 10 largest securities, declined from 42% in the 1880s to 24% in the 1890s and then to 17% after the turn of the century. Similarly, portfolio turnover, defined as the ratio of the lesser value of purchase and sales over the total portfolio value, averaged only 2%.
Turning to the sector allocation of the fund, before the 1891 change in statutes, the FCIT distributed its investments between sovereign and colonial government bonds and government-guaranteed corporation bonds, particularly railway bonds (Figure 2) . The enlargement of the trust's investment scope allowed investment in the securities of "companies or corporations not guaranteed by any Government, State, or Municipality" as reported by Lord Eustace to the 1891 AGM. 23 Although this led to a growing interest in public utilities and in industrial ventures, the trust in large part used this added flexibility to increase its exposure to railways. 23 Cit. in McKendrick and Newlands (1999: 66) . In the next section, we examine the degree of diversification achieved by FCIT.
Portfolio diversification
Based on aggregate market indices, the literature has underscored the gains from diversification implied by the composition of the aggregated security portfolio available to British investors Ukhov 2006, Chabot and Kurz 2010) . Here we seek to identify these gains for a leading institutional investor of the period.
We can answer the question of how well diversified was FCIT by comparing its portfolios with three different benchmarks: (i) a GDP-weighted global benchmark; (ii) the aggregate patterns of foreign portfolio investment by British investors; and (iii) the optimal portfolios implied by the historic risks and returns available to investors during this period.
GDP-weighted benchmark
In the absence of a market-capitalisation-weighted global benchmark, we can make use of the Maddison data on the distribution of global GDP to create a GDP-weighted Tables 3 and 4 here Bearing these caveats in mind, we compare the regional and sector breakdown of the FCIT portfolios with the British capital exports cumulated from 1880 at 5 yearly intervals beginning in 1885 and show the differences between the FCIT allocation and the regional share of cumulative capital flows (Tables 3 and 4) .
Broadly speaking, FCIT replicates the characteristics of British investment abroad, documented in the literature, namely, a preference for investments in the regions of new European settlement and for such infrastructure investments as railways and public utilities (Feis 1930 , Fishlow 1985 , Davis and Gallman 2001 ). Yet, there are also marked differences in asset allocation. Regionally, FCIT was heavily underweighted in the Asia/Pacific region, and correspondingly overweight in American securities, especially South American (Table 3, 24 Unfortunately, we cannot apply the same emerging market definition in sections 4.2 and 4.3 below given the lack of granularity in these alternative benchmark data. 25 One option would be to reconstitute the evolution of the stock of British investments abroad by using a version of the permanent inventory methodology. That would require some assumptions about rates of return and attrition which would be open to criticism. There is, to be sure, a long literature on the estimation of the total return on the composite British portfolio (Edelstein 1982 , Davis and Huttenback 1986 , Chabot and Kurz 2010 . However, it is practically impossible to identify which fraction of income was reinvested and in which securities. It is also virtually impossible to identify divestitures after the flotation of foreign securities and initial capital calls. 26 On Britain see Grossman (2002) , on France Le Bris and Hautcoeur (2010), Annaert et al. (2010) on Belgium, and on the US Goetzmann et al. (2001) .
Panel C).
27 Second, somewhat ironically, FCIT had a much lower exposure to the British Empire than the aggregate of capital exports with an underweighting which ranged between 19% and 39% over the period (Table 3, Panel C) . 28 Third, FCIT preferred a more conservative allocation of investments by industrial sector, favouring railways over natural resources and manufacturing after its change in investment scope in 1891 (Table 4) . 29 This allocation policy seems to reflect the proclaimed conservative disposition of the FCIT trustees for the most liquid emerging market securities. Moreover, railway investments were made more attractive by the frequent official guarantees attached to them, and also by the relatively better disclosure of information to investors thanks to the many trade publications of the period that publicised construction rates, and traffic and income returns from railways around the globe (Bordo et al. 2000) .
Optimal Portfolios
Following Goetzmann and Ukhov (2006) Since the optimal weights resulting from this type of portfolio optimisation technique are sensitive to minor changes in the expected returns of the assets we employ a bootstrapping procedure to improve the precision of our estimates. According to this procedure, we make 1000 random draws from the distribution of returns for each sector. On each draw, the vector of expected returns and the variance-covariance matrix is estimated, and the optimal portfolio weights computed. From the resulting distribution of optimal weights, we estimate their mean values for each of 1890, 1900, and 1907. Next, we exclude any sectors with a mean weight of less than 0.1%, and rerun the bootstrapping procedure.
The mean optimal weights are reported in Table 5 , Panel B, the corresponding actual FCIT portfolio weights in Panel A and the difference between the two in Panel C. 27 The interest of the FCIT promoters in American investment is further underscored by the creating of a dedicated vehicle, the "American Investment Fund, Ltd," set up in the 1873 with a capital of £1 million. 28 This is not an artifact of our inability to value the aggregate British portfolio at market prices. Woodruff (1966) attempted to do so for two benchmark years, 1896 and 1913, and the share of imperial investments is even larger than on the cumulated flows. 29 There is likely to be an interaction between the FCIT preference for fixed-income securities and the sectors it got to invest in. For instance, mining companies mainly floated shares, which limited the ability of a fund with the structure of FCIT to invest in them. By 1907 its portfolios were quite close to those of the rational investor and reflected the diversification potential of making substantial allocations to the bonds of North America and countries outside the British Empire. The deviation from the optimal weights in the 'Other' component is mainly driven by a greater exposure to the shares of Latin American railways.
Performance
Buy-and-hold returns
As discussed in section 3, we have annual snapshots of the FCIT portfolios but no transaction data. We therefore estimate FCIT performance in terms of the buy-and-hold portfolio returns over each year from 1880 to the end of 1912. Given FCIT pursued a nonactive investment strategy and exhibited low portfolio turnover, it seems appropriate to calibrate performance in this way. We can test this hypothesis about FCIT's buy and hold investment approach in two ways. The first regresses individual holdings of portfolio securities at book values on the contemporary and lagged prices of the same securities.
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Since we measure prices at the end of each year, this model tests, in effect, whether the managers of FCIT reacted to price changes during the year. The results in Table 6 show that the managers of FCIT did not directly react to short-term price movements. In addition and perhaps surprisingly, when we control for whether a security was in default during each year, FCIT did not change their allocations away from securities temporarily in default. 31 This is also confirmed if we estimate the model in differences, i.e. regressing any changes in the holdings of a particular security on its price change during the year. The last 2 columns of Table 6 show that the decisions to increase or decrease the exposure to a given security
were not reactions to short-run price movements. Table 6 here 30 We naturally exclude securities when they are included for the first time in the portfolio. 31 FCIT noted which securities were in default in its annual reports. Note that we run a FGLS panel model because of the presence of panel autocorrelation.
We estimate the buy-and-hold total return for each security in a given year by summing the income, both interest and dividends, and capital appreciation for each security held by FCIT. Using the weightings of each security in the overall portfolio at the start of the year we sum the weighted returns to arrive at portfolio income returns, capital gains (and losses) and total returns in both nominal and real terms. The results are summarised in Table 7 . The major financial crises and panics are identifiable in Table Decomposing total returns by industry, it is clear that FCIT performance was driven by its investments in government and railroads securities, especially after the change in FCIT's investment objectives (Figure 3) . The late 1890s and early 1900s in particular were especially profitable for overseas railway investments. Likewise, although the 1890 Baring crisis is usually associated with the sovereign market, starting with Argentina's default, FCIT's portfolio was mostly adversely affected through its holdings of bonds and preferred stock in Argentine and other South American railways. Although eschewing an active investment strategy, the managers of FCIT sometimes pursued a deep value strategy by investing in deeply discounted securities. Accordingly, they made substantial purchases of common and preferred railway stock in the US and South America trading at large discounts to par. These securities quickly gained value in the following years and to such an extent that FCIT departed from its typical buy-and-hold strategy and realised some of those gains.
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The absence of capitalisation-weighted global benchmarks for this period makes it hard to assess how well the FCIT did relative to the market (or the investment trust industry).
We can, however, compare FCIT returns to available total return indices for foreign bonds and foreign stocks from Chabot and Kurz (2010) for 1880 -1907 and Edelstein (1982 for 1908-12 (Figure 4) . We splice the two data series and create a composite index weighting the bond and stock index returns by the annual FCIT bond and stock allocations listed in Table 1 .
Over the period 1880-1912, FCIT returned 5.2% p.a. versus 4.9% for the composite index displaying a slightly higher standard deviation of 4.1% versus 3.7% and a slightly better Sharpe Ratio of 0.68 against 0.66. The higher volatility is largely due to the adverse effect of the 1890 Baring crisis, despite coming through the 1893 Panama panic and especially the 1907 crisis relatively unscarred. It is also worth noting that FCIT returned considerably more than the 2.2% p.a. offered by British Consols over the same time horizon.
Figures 4 and 5
Although volatility was low, one concern of any investor in FCIT would be the extent to which he might suffer a period of low or even negative returns. We calculate the average annual portfolio real returns for all possible periods beginning in 1880 from one year up to a maximum of 33 years ( Figure 5) . The results are very creditable to FCIT. Over any 5 year period FCIT would have managed to generate positive real returns.
Share price and NAV
Since FCIT's preference and deferred shares were quoted on the LSE from 1880, we can also monitor share price performance. only 1891 generating a double-digit fall (-14.6%); otherwise, total returns were positive throughout. Consistent therefore with their right to residual cash flows and bearing greater financial risk, investors in the deferred shares earned somewhat more, 6.9% p.a., thanks 32 The largest appreciations were registered for the stock of the St Louis and San Francisco Railway Co. (between +200% and +300%, depending on the issues), and the Oregon Railway and Navigation Co. (+30%), with similar performances for the bonds of the Atcheson, Topeka and Santa Fé Railroad (some of which doubled in value), and the Calgary and Edmonton Railway Co (+56%).
largely to a higher income return, 5.6%. The preferred shares returned a steadier 4.5% p.a., with income return and capital appreciation averaging 4.0% and 0.5% respectively.
Figures 6 and 7 here
In keeping with industry practice, investors were not told the net asset value (NAV) of the underlying investments by the trust managers until well after WW1. However, a diligent shareholder with lots of time on their hands might have been able to price the underlying portfolio once per year as we have tried to do. In estimating the NAV of FCIT, we treat the preference shares as a prior fixed claim on the net assets of the trust. We then compare the NAV attributable to deferred shareholders with the deferred share price at each December year end, to determine whether the shares traded at a premium/discount to NAV.
The deferred shares according to the results graphed in The discount averaged 17% over the whole period. Closed end fund discounts are also common in both the UK and US in the modern era since the 1970s, especially in the UK when the average discount reached 50%. 33 Several explanations have been put forward for such persistent discounts among them illiquid securities, tax and agency problems with the investment managers (Dimson and Minio-Kozerski, 1999) . The latter two rationales are less applicable to the pre-1913 era. However, the presence of illiquid securities representing between 10% and 15% of the total portfolio does seem a plausible explanation for the level of discount observed. Whilst contemporary investors did not pay any attention to NAV as such, the shares did not appear to trade outside the bounds of what modern investors have come to expect.
Comparison with Emerging Markets Today
Following the first era of financial globalisation, global capital markets regressed along with the prospects for emerging market investing. As Goetzmann and Jorion (1999) put it, some of these markets now became "submerged" markets. Hence, in the modern era spanning a period of 17 years, emerging market debt generated a premium of 3.1% p.a. over the domestic government bond alternative, whilst in the pre-WW1 era spanning a period of 33 years, FCIT returned an identical premium over Consols as we saw in section 5.1. Moreover, this return premium was earned with much lower volatility, only 4.7% compared to 15.8% in the recent past. Similarly, the Sharpe Ratio was higher at 0.67 in the earlier period compared to 0.53. The greater return volatility recently largely reflects the poor performance of emerging debt compared to US government debt in the difficult years of 1994 (Peso crisis -23%,), 1998 (LTCM, -19%) and 2008 (subprime crisis, -26%). In summary, emerging debt in the first era of financial globalisation offered investors a substantial return premium with substantially less risk.
Conclusion
FCIT provided the average investor with the opportunity to diversify his portfolio into emerging markets during the first era of financial globalisation at an extremely low cost compared to the management fees charged by today's asset managers. Back in the late 19 th century, when it would be too costly both in time and money for individual investors to try and replicate such a portfolio, this proved to be a highly attractive and convenient solution for the majority of the investment public.
The trust's heavy investment in emerging market bonds and in the American continent in particular paid off. The fund's NAV averaged returns in excess of British Consols and of the global ex-UK benchmark whilst also offering a better risk-return trade-off.
Furthermore, its portfolios were close to how the rational investor would have invested based on mean-variance optimisations using historic asset returns. Unlike emerging market investors in the modern period, FCIT investors experienced only one substantial downturn in the early 1890's and much less volatility over the period as a whole.
The trust's deferred shares offered an attractive 6.9% return in excess of its NAV performance benefitting from the leverage provided by the issue of preference shares. Whilst the deferred shares consistently traded at a discount to the NAV of the underlying investments, the level of discount was not out of line with what investors a century later experienced and reflected the exposure to illiquid securities in the portfolio.
FCIT delivered to the investing general public what it promised at very modest cost.
In so doing, it illustrated the attractions of the investment trust model and resisted the temptations to engage in pyramiding, over-leveraging and speculation which came to characterise the investment trust sector in Britain before WW1 and in the US in the late
1920s. There could be no higher testament to FCIT's attractions than the fact that this was the only investment trust share which John Maynard Keynes included in the security portfolio he managed for his father before WW1. FCIT stands as a shining example of a highly successful financial innovation. -15.7 -15.7 -8.6 -21.1 -25.4 -22.4 -22.9 British Empire -30.1 -22.1 -18.8 -32.6 -35.1 -37.7 -39.0 -9.8 -9.8 -7.3 -6.6 -5.9 Natural resources -10.1 -5 -5.9 -6.8 -10.6 -9.8 -9.6 Mfg & misc.
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